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ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF LOWER
FEDERAL COURTS, JUDGES, AND THE
RULE OF LAW
Alfred S. Koneftky*
THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: LOWER FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION AND THE SECOND PARTY SYSTEM, 1829-1861. By Kermit L.

Hall. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1980. Pp. xvii, 268.
$19.50.
FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY 17891816. By Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1978. Pp. ix, 234. $16.50.

Kermit Hall and Mary Tachau have written books that at first
glance appear to complement one another in adding to our slim
knowledge about lower federal courts and their judges in post-Revolutionary and antebellum America. Each, however, has a di.fferent
historical approach. Tachau is thoroughly phenomenological and
eschews most theoretical inquiry, while Hall confines his analysis
within the parameters of antebellum political history. Both authors
are sound historians, but neither quite knows what to do with his
findings. Although Hall is better than Tachau in wrestling with the
significance of the historical data, neither appreciates fully where the
facts stand in relation to the big picture. Since I cannot convey in a
short review what Tachau and Hall have mined in the way of historical detail, I will focus on only one problem that the books raised by
implication: where the events presented could fit into the current
debate over the historical role of the rule of law.
Professor Tachau's book is built upon a formidable research
base. She has examined the hitherto ignored 2,290 cases that came
before the federal district court in Kentucky between its inception in
1789 and the death of the original district judge, anti-Federalist
Harry Innes, in 1816. Her general argument is relatively straightforward: Innes's court enjoyed a sound reputation within the potentially hostile Kentucky community because it was accessible and
• Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. B.A. 1967, Columbia University; J.D. 1970, Boston College. - Ed.
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responsive, and eventually provided "the most visible" and stable
"link" (p. 191) between the West and the federal government. To
support her thesis, Tachau provides material on procedure, private
civil suits, criminal cases, land disputes, and the enforcement of the
internal revenue laws. Revenue cases accounted for about one third
of the court's business during this period (pp. 6, 95). I would like to
focus particularly on the attempt to impose and enforce the despised
whiskey tax.
Tachau sets the historical scene well. Passed shortly after the
birth of the new republic,
[t]he whiskey tax was designed by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton to defray the cost to the federal government of its recent assumption of the debts of the states. Most Kentuckians thought that
they had already done their part in absorbing state debts by accepting
depreciated currency and by purchasing Virginia treasury warrants for
Kentucky lands, which were proving to be worth little more than the
paper they were written on. They strongly objected to paying taxes to
a government that seemed uninterested in solving either of their most
pressing problems: protecting them from the Indians or securing the
free navigation of the Mississippi from the Spanish. Moreover, a tax
on domestic distilled spirits appeared to them to be discriminatory because it did not fall equally on all parts of the country. It seemed unfair because whiskey was often the only common medium of exchange
in the West, where specie was rare. And it seemed oppressive because
it taxed their most valuable export. [P. 98.]

And so Kentucky resisted, not as violently as Pennsylvania, where
federal troops were needed to suppress the famed Whiskey Rebellion, but nevertheless boldly and stubbornly. Kentuckians could resist without violence because they had acquired a powerful ally: the
law as espoused by the federal district court. The legal challenge to
the internal revenue laws employed evasive devices to ensure that
the tax remained uncollectible.
Tachau richly details the federal government's attempts to enforce the whiskey tax. Her examination of conflicting legal and
political strategies and her analysis of the intermittently arrogant
and occasionally incompetent Federalist enforcement attempts is
often perceptive, but her major effort is to tie together two significant
historical ideas: first, the utilization of rigorous English commonlaw procedural technicalities and standards, and second, the surprisingly good local reputation of the Kentucky federal court. She overlooked, however, the most important and illuminating aspect of her
findings, and in the process created, I think totally unconsciously, an
historical illusion.
What Tachau has unwittingly uncovered is that Judge Innes's
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handling of the whiskey tax prosecutions in Kentucky was a classic
example of the manipulation of the rule oflaw. Judge Innes, a political ally of Jefferson, was systematically making it difficult, if not
impossible, for any Federalist prosecutor to win convictions under
the terms of an act promulgated by a Federalist Congress. By interposing the strict procedural standards of British common law,. supposedly antithetical to the Jeffersonian world view, Innes protected
anti-Federalist defendants who asserted their local customary rights
to produce whiskey. He apparently had little compunction in using
the law of the King's Bench, so admired by the Federalists, to further
his own Jeffersonian political principles. He thus managed to hamstring the effective administration of Federalist law by using a favorite Federalist device, English common law.
What does Innes's behavior say about the rule of law as an effective jurisprudential concept in early post-Revolutionary America?
Was the rule of law, as symbolized in this instance by strict English
procedural standards, simply raised, as any legal tool, somewhat
cynically to serve a political, and certainly not neutral, function?
These questions are worth inquiring into, but Tachau is apparently
either unaware of or uninterested in the recent significant literature
on the rule of law 1 to which her work might contribute. In ignoring
these questions, unfortunately, she may have misperceived events.
In her eyes, Innes quite naturally went about his business in bringing
to the frontier the civilizing, neutral, dispassionate English jurisprudence that legitimated his judging. I suspect Judge Innes was
smarter than that. If in fact, as Tachau contends, Kentuckians
respected their federal court because it enforced the rigorous technicalities of English law, it seems unlikely that they did so out of devotion to English jurisprudence. Such faith would seem almost
counterintuitive. What seems more likely is that Kentuckians
respected Judge Innes because he was willing to use law, from
whatever source, to reach appropriate political results. Law, therefore, was used to further politics. Kentuckians appreciated English
procedure not for its neutrality, but for the services that it could perform in the guise of neutrality.
E.P. Thompson has written of early eighteenth-century England's
Black Act that the rule of law
l. See, e.g., E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL 25-49 (1974); E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS
AND HUNTERS 258-69 (1975); Hay, Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S
FATAL TREE 17-63 (1975); F. NEUMANN, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Socielj', in THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 39-43 (1957); Horwitz, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. 561 (1977).
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could not be reserved for the exclusive use only of . . [a particular
social] class. The law, in its forms and traditions, entailed principles of
equity and universality which, perforce, had to be extended to all sorts
and degrees of men. And since this was of necessity so, ideology could
tum necessity to advantage. What had been devised by men of property as a defense against arbitrary power could be turned into service
as an apologia for property in the face of the propertyless. And the
apologia was serviceable up to a point: for these "propertyless," as we
have seen, comprised multitudes of men and women who themselves
enjoyed, in fact, petty property rights or agrarian use-rights whose definition was inconceivable without the forms oflaw. Hence the ideology
of the great struck root in a soil, however shallow, of actuality. And
the courts gave substance to the ideology by the scrupulous care with
which, on occasion, they adjudged petty rights, and, on all occasions,
preserved proprieties and forms. 2

Thompson's insights seem particularly applicable to Judge Innes's
response to the whiskey tax. By applying English procedural standards - in manipulating the rule of law - Judge Innes nullified
positive law and in effect reaffirmed customary law. The rule of law
thus apparently preserved the integrity of certain neutral and unassailable legal principles. But there may have been a hidden cost.
Though from the perspective of Kentucky whiskey distillers an appropriate and justifiable outcome was reached, the hidden message
was that the rule of law could just as easily be used, in different
hands, to suppress conduct that most would recognize as legitimate.
The rule of law can only pretend to be neutral. Judge Innes intuitively understood that, conveniently situated, it could be used to justify the elevation of one set of political principles over another only
as long as the appearance of neutrality was maintained. In the face
of diametrically opposed political views, the rule of law cannot guarantee that the appearance of evenhandedness and neutrality will
avoid conflict. This is an underlying theme of some interest and importance in Kermit Hall's book.
Hall has written a very able book describing the politics of the
2. E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 264. In the concluding portion of his book, Thompson
is concerned with the complex relationship between the rule of law and class relations, and in
particular the extent to which law mediated class relations. In reviewing Tachau's book, I
cannot directly address Thompson's theoretical revisions of traditional Marxist thought. First,
I do not know anything about class relations in Kentucky circa 1800, and second, Tachau's
book, one of the few sources available to me on the subject, does not tell me anything useful.
All that appears from the litigation, an extremely risky source from which to generalize, is that
the people against whom the federal government sought to enforce the federal law seemed lo
be either individuals relatively isolated from the central government seeking to maintain their
customary rights or Jeffersonian political partisans of some prominence. (The tax collectors, of
course, were Federalists.) Standing alone, this record does not prove that class conflict existed.
I am far more interested, though, in the theoretical implications of Thompson's broader point
about the rule of law as rule of law, pure and simple.
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selection process for federal district court and territorial court judges
from the presidencies of Andrew Jackson to James Buchanan - the
period of the second party system.3 Hall argues that "the distribution of political influence through the judicial patronage during the
era of the second party system can be viewed in the context of political modernization" (p. xv). To determine whether lower federal
court judicial selection is an example of "political modernization,"
Hall focused on two criteria: first, "the extent to which the progress
became institutionalized," and second, "the degree to which a functional elite replaced a traditional elite" (p. xv). Institutionalized judicial selection "tends to become formal, impersonal, automatic, and
bureaucratic" (p. xv), almost Weberian, as it becomes more modem,
and as a result "nominees for appointment to public office are usually selected on the basis of special training and experience" (p. xv),
and become somehow "functional." The movement, then, is away
from "traditional" expressions of political behavior, such as the selection of judges through "an informal hierarchy of kinship and
friendship relations" (p. xv), which was supposedly symptomatic of
presidential lower federal court appointments in the first American
party system dominated by Federalists and ·Jeffersonians. The vehicle with which the transformation was accomplished, according to -lit
Hall, was the disciplining force of party politics as practiced by
Whigs and Democrats. Parties rationalized what was once left to
traditional kinship and friendship ties. The role of parties can best
be appreciated by tracing the interaction of two constraints: those
that emerged from members of the political party in control, in this
case, the gradual rise of an early form of senatorial courtesy, and
those that emerged from the "executive branch's internal organization" (p. xvii), in this case the allocation of the president's control of
the political patronage process for judicial selection.
In enormous, almost numbing, detail, Hall takes us through a
painstaking re-creation of the judicial selection process in a great
number of appointments in every presidential administration from
1829 to 1861. (I never thought, for instance, that in order to pay my
dues as a legal historian, I would be required to read twenty pages
on the lower federal court appointments of Millard Fillmore.) Along
3. Hall captures the current historiographical characterization of the second party system:
[S]o called to distinguish it from earlier party competition between Federalists and Jeffersonians, [it] began with the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 and ended with the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860. The second party system was the product of a
distinctive political culture in which popular participation and partisanship replaced social deference and disdain of party.
P. xiii (footnote omitted).
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the way, we are treated to mostly pithy, sometimes cryptic, and occasionally perceptive descriptions of the internal dynamics of the various appointments. Hall describes who was proposing whom, where
the proposers, opposers, and prospective nominees stood within the
various factions in the state parties (there were many factions Whigs and Democrats were hardly monolithic), where the same clusters stood in light of the distribution of power in the House and the
Senate, and what the aspirations of the various presidents were as
they created and then attempted to enforce standards in the appointments process.
, Hall shows a fine command of both the different political situations and the general tendencies and trends. A number of institutional developments did occur - interested senators and
congressmen tended to assert greater control over time, stepping into
the increasing power void created by undisciplined, squabbling,
party organizations and weak presidents without natural constituencies. Eventually responsibility for screening and managing judicial
patronage appointments was transferred from an overburdened Secretary of State to a less burdened and seemingly more qualified Attorney General. Not surprisingly, however, traditional kinship and
friendship ties lingered to a degree despite the increasingly "modem" institutionalization of appointment criteria, as appointment
"mediators" continued to emphasize that these ties could cement
political alliances.
Whether all of this is more "modem" in comparison with other
historical stages or periods is not an issue on which I have a position.
What does strike me as interesting is another theme illustrated by the
pattern of appointments - a pattern that emerged as the Civil War
approached. Sectionalism and slavery dominated the debates about,
and the perceptions of the prospective appointees.4 Particularly as
4. In addition to analyzing the political considerations that led to appointments, Hall also
includes a substantial amount of very valuable prosopographical data on all the lower court
federal judges appointed during this period. In the process, a kind of input-output problem is
raised. Hall organizes his material in two ways: internally, comparing both district court to
territorial court appointees, and Whig to Democratic presidential appointees; and externally,
comparing the post-1829 appointees to those of the pre-1829 period. (One problem is that the
book fails to make the comparison to the pre-1829 group on the basis of the judicial selection
process itself. We are, more or less, left assuming it was different.) Hall quantifies a good deal
of social historical material - social origins, social standing, education, age, and political activism. It turns out that on the social status side of the equation, there were few internal or
external differences. Both Whigs and Democrats appointed judges largely from the same
"elite or prominent" social class, and ignored those candidates who had only "modest" roots.
And the differences between pre-1829 appointments and post-Jacksonian appointments is statistically quite small. In short, judges generally came from the same social "class," as difficult
as that term is to define, from the Revolution to the Civil War. This fact raises several interesting questions. Not the least of these is how the similarity in class origin (one form of input)
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Democrats Pierce and Buchanan grappled with the dual legacy of
the Mexican War- expansionism and slavery- and attempted to
forestall "the impending crisis," a curious kind of compromise developed. The compromise was based on the perceived need, on the eve
of the disintegration of the Union, to appoint judges, in both the
North and South, who understood the necessity of imposing the rule
of law on the threatened chaos.
The compromise was affected with an eye toward finding a solution to the moral problem of slavery. The rise of the Republican
party in the 1850s was built on the failure of Democrats and Whigs
to confront successfully the moral failings of the state. The legal necessity of preserving the Union "added political fervor to the notion
that in a society paradoxically committed to slavery and human freedom, moral obligation derived from the individual's rather than the
state's understanding of the law" (p. 130). "Sectional harmony"
(p. 149) became the preferred solution. The search for "harmony"
intruded itself into the judicial selection process as well as other aspects of national life since judges were likely to have to make important decisions affecting various aspects of slavery under the
Constitution.5 Therefore, it was important to appoint judges who
had the true interests of the Union at heart. Judicial appointments
were made to capitalize on and exploit "the image of a disinterested
judiciary" in order to promote "sectional harmony" (p. 149). In theory, the implementation of this program was easy. As long as one
could find "qualified" judges, politically qualified of course, one
could insure success. Federal district judges "in the free states would
enforce the Fugitive Slave Law; their slave-state counterparts would
supervise prosecutions of violators of the neutrality and slave trade
laws" (p. 149). The commitment to the equal enforcement of the
affected the evolutionary pattern of private-law legal doctrine (the output). Obviously the
problem of grappling with enough variables to get an effective model for evaluating judicial
behavior is incredibly complex. But it is an intriguing thought, given that we know so little
about these early judges, that social class may be an important factor in determining ideology.
Obviously social class does not necessarily determine ideology. There can be vast ideological
differences within a social class. But it does appear that lower court federal judges were for a
long time socially homogeneous. The similarities may warrant further inquiry.

5. It does not appear from Hall's study whether the judges appointed in the last decade or
so before the Civil War had any substantial impact on the legal issues surrounding slavery.
Hall makes no attempt to evaluate doctrinal output based on or matched to the political criteria isolated in the appointments process. He follows, for instance, no individual judicial careers. Though beyond the parameters of Hall's study, such an evaluation would have proved
useful in measuring, even in Hall's terms, the effectiveness of the modem, party-directed appointment trend. Finally, for a useful study of how courts dealt with the legal aspects of slavery, see P. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION (1981).
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law, North and South, free and slave, was designed to defuse the
potential conflict between moral principles.
This strategy failed. As Hall points out:
Equal federal enforcement of the laws did not mean equal justice. The
legal perpetuation of slavery compromised the legal institutions of the
nation to such a degree that the doctrine of judicial impartiality came
to be seen as a violation of the moral imperatives of the more radical
element of the Republican party. [P. 149.]

In a sense, then, the Civil War became a crisis of law and order
because law could not carry the burden of moral violation. The rule
of law, appearing neutral, assumed totally artificial importance - a
mere symbol powerless to prevent the oncoming confrontation. The
legal idea of constitutional union could not incorporate the moral
conception of freedom. What appeared neutral and unassailable the equal enforcement of the law - could not disarm the moral assault on the law's integrity. What reliance on the rule of law had
established was that equality does not necessarily mean freedom.
The attempt to use law to suppress the moral dilemma ultimately
failed, and with it, the right of law to command our unqualified respect.
Though the reasons for the failures of the past may eventually
become clear, it is not altogether obvious how they might aid us in
arriving at what our present alternative visions, hopes, or social theories ought to be. It is not even apparent that we consistently understand what we ought to avoid. What Tachau and Hall have done is
to give us more grist, in very fine historical detail, for the mill.

